Defence of a basic voluntary act requirement in criminal law from philosophies of action by Child, John
 
 
Defence of a basic voluntary act requirement in
criminal law from philosophies of action
Child, John
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Child, J 2019, 'Defence of a basic voluntary act requirement in criminal law from philosophies of action' New
Criminal Law Review, vol. 24, no. 1.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Checked for eligibility 06/02/2019
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of an article forthcoming in New Criminal Law Review.
http://nclr.ucpress.edu/
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 29. Apr. 2019
 1 
 
DEFENCE OF A BASIC VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL LAW 
FROM PHILOSOPHIES OF ACTION 
J.J. Child, University of Birmingham* 
When looking to identify the basic ingredients required for criminal responsibility,1 reference 
is standardly made to a voluntary act requirement (VAR). We blame a defendant (D) for what 
she has done where such doing or is proscribed by law; we do not punish mere thoughts or 
character. Variations of the VAR trace back to Hume and other eighteenth century writers, 
translated into modern legal thinking by Austin,2 and followed/refined by a greater number 
since.3 Narrowing from a complete offence description, or even a complete actus reus 
description, the VAR seeks to identify the root of D’s causal agency and responsibility, most 
commonly understood in terms of voluntary bodily movement (but also often including certain 
omissions).4 Focus on voluntary bodily movement or omission makes sense. In the context of 
a potential criminal event, once it has been established that D voluntarily moved her body in a 
certain way, D’s voluntary conduct can provide a potential nexus of agency to prohibited results 
caused by that conduct, accompanying circumstances, mens rea, and so on. Where voluntary 
conduct is lacking there can be no such nexus between D and any potential surrounding harms, 
and so no liability should be found.5   
                                                          
* I would like to thank Professor Antony Duff, Andrew Simester, and Dr Gavin Byrne for comments on a draft 
of this article. Thanks also to the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg 
where much of the work was completed, and associated funding from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. 
1 Most theorists share the desire to identify minimum ingredients, to help make sense of and limit the boundaries 
of criminal law. However, many also question whether such ingredients will ever be found. R.A. Duff, ‘Vice, 
Virtue, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law?’ (2002) 6 BuffCrimLRev 147.        
2 J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence of the Philosophy of Positive Law (5th Ed, 1885). 
3 See, in particular, J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (Vol 2, Macmillan, 1883); C. Kenny 
& J. Turner, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law (17th ed, CUP, 1958); D. Davidson, ‘Agency’ in Essays on 
Actions and Events (Oxford, 2001) 43; M. Moore, Act and Crime (OUP, 1993); P. Robinson, Structure and 
Function in Criminal Law (OUP, 1997), G. Yaffe, ‘The Voluntary Act Requirement’ in A. Marmor (ed.) The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge, 2012) 174.    
4 W Cook, ‘Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law’ (1916) 26 Yale LJ 645, 648.   
5 This applies to both fault based as well as so-called strict or absolute liability offences.  
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 The potential for the VAR to perform this role effectively within the substantive 
criminal law has an intuitive appeal often shared by supporters and critics alike, operating to 
ensure the basic links of agency required for moral and criminal responsibility.6 However, 
despite courts’ continuing to affirm the VAR as axiomatic to criminal responsibility,7 it has 
become ever more difficult for courts and commentators to maintain a consistent and defensible 
interpretation of the requirement. This is because, drawing upon debates within the wider 
philosophies of action, criminal law theorists have increasingly challenged our core 
understandings of the VAR, and particularly the potential identification of voluntary bodily 
movement at its heart.8 Following two lines of attack, critics have questioned whether the 
descriptive identification of bodily movement within the VAR is theoretically sustainable, as 
well as whether (if made sustainable) the VAR can play any useful normative role within the 
criminal law. Duff presents such criticisms as a catch22 for advocates of a VAR: 
 
On the one hand, the notion of an ‘act’ could be given a reasonably determinate meaning: 
but it is then quite implausible to claim that the criminal law either is or should be founded 
on the ‘act requirement’… On the other hand, we might extend the notion of an ‘act’ to 
cover [all cases within the law] but this would empty the ‘act requirement’ of any 
substantive content…9  
 
                                                          
6 Acknowledged variously by Duff in particular. Cf. For critique of this intuitive appeal, R. Shapira, ‘Structural 
Flaws of the “Willed Bodily Movement” Theory of Action’ (1997) 1 BuffCrimLRev 349, 383-402. 
7 See, for example, the recent judgment of the High Court of Australia in Koani v The Queen [2017] HCA 42, 
[21].  
8 See, in particular, H.L.A. Hart, ‘Acts of Will and Responsibility’ in Punishment and Responsibility (OUP, 
1968) 90; M. Corrado, ‘Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?’ (1993) 142 UPaLRev 1529; G.P. 
Fletcher, ‘On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movement’ (1994) 142 UPaLRev 1443; A.P. Simester, ‘On the 
So-called Requirement for Voluntary Action’ (1997) 1(2) BuffCrimLRev 403; Shapira (n6 above); D. Husak, 
‘The Alleged Act Requirement in Criminal Law’ in Deigh & Dolinko (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Criminal Law (OUP, 2011) 107; R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime (OUP, 2009) Ch. 5.  
9 R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (OUP, 1996) 243.   
 3 
 
What follows provides a defence to both parts of this challenge by stripping back the VAR to 
its basic defensible core elements: addressing the descriptive challenge in Part 2 and the 
normative challenge in Part 3. It is contended here that both lines of attack can be answered, 
and that a coherent and normatively useful articulation of the VAR can be achieved. To this 
end, the article defends a version of the VAR defined in terms of voluntary bodily movements 
and omissions to move. This definition, including the role of omissions, requires considerable 
unpacking and defending. However, before we begin this defence, two points of clarification 
are required within Part 1: setting out the role of the philosophies of action within my account, 
and the practical relevance of the discussion.  
 
PART 1. THE VAR AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF ACTION  
There is a noble tradition of philosophical debate challenging, informing and shaping our 
understanding of legal concepts, and so the presence of such debate engaging with core terms 
such as ‘action’, ‘omission’, and ‘voluntariness’ should be neither surprising nor cause for 
concern. However, in the context of the VAR, it is contended that the relationship between 
theoretical and doctrinal analysis has become skewed in favour of philosophical debate, with 
such debate increasingly dictating both the critique and the defence of that requirement.10 Two 
damaging trends have emerged from this.  
The first trend relates to something akin to a doctrinal disowning of the VAR. As core 
terms within the VAR have become associated with debates within the philosophies of action, 
so we see an increased reluctance from courts and doctrinal commentators to offer precise legal 
definitions and/or to engage with the doctrinal role of the VAR. This is most obvious in 
                                                          
10 The only alternative, it seems, has been to simply avoid theoretical criticism by appealing to the intuitive or 
long-standing acceptance of the VAR. This is the approach of most criminal law textbooks, for example. 
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jurisdictions with criminal codes, where the VAR may be codified,11 alongside related terms 
such as ‘action’ and ‘omission’. Despite the importance of clear definitions when applying the 
law, we have seen drafting committees increasingly willing to provide non-specific definitions, 
or to propose the removal of definitions altogether, explicitly referencing complexities within 
the philosophical context as their reason for doing so.12 In uncodified jurisdictions such as 
England and Wales, similar vagaries are apparent. Where elements of the VAR are discussed 
at all, they are invariably confined to brief (and undefined) headlines about the importance of 
‘consciousness’13 and ‘willing’.14 And rather than being presented as a an essential offence 
element, we see discussion jettisoned to the ‘defence of automatism’, a concept that may at 
best be interpreted as an unnecessary synonym of involuntariness,15 and at worst as an uncertain 
sub-set of involuntariness without justification or use.16 The effects have been pervasive, and 
will be explored further in Part 3. Essentially, current uncertainty as to the content of the VAR 
has provided scant defence against the creation of apparently inconsistent legislation,17 and the 
divorced concept of automatism has been left to develop as a narrowing defence.18   
 The second trend has occurred within the philosophical debate, where theories of action 
in law (ie, definitions of the VAR) have become combined or conflated with comprehensive 
theories of action in general. An example of this, which we return to in Part 2, has stemmed 
                                                          
11 See, for example, the US MPC §2.01.   
12 New Zealand and Australia provide useful examples. In New Zealand, the Crimes Consultative Committee 
recommended in 1991 that the definitions of ‘action’ and ‘omission’ should be removed from the Crimes Bill 
(Report on 1989 Crimes Bill (1991) 9-12). In Australia, the Model Criminal Code drafting committee omitted a 
definition of ‘conduct’, citing the ‘complex’ context within philosophy (Australian Model Criminal Code 
(Commentary) s202).  
13 Murray v The Queen [2002] HCA 26; Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92, 98; T [1990] Crim LR 256, 257. 
14 Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2, [18]. 
15 It was interpreted this way by Lord Denning in Bratty v AG for NI [1963] AC 386.  
16 If all offences require voluntariness, then why look to isolate a sub-set of this and refer to it as a defence? See 
discussion in Part 3. 
17 For discussion, see, G.R. Sullivan, ‘Conduct and Proof of Conduct – Two Fundamental Conditions for the 
Imposition of Criminal Liability’ in K. Kaikobad & M. Bohlander (eds.) International Law and Power: 
Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 235. 
18 Discussed further in Part 3. 
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from the work of Moore.19 Moore’s approach fuses the discussion of action within the VAR 
with a comprehensive metaphysical theory of action in general, defining both in terms of 
volitions causing bodily movements, and with each integral to the other. Contrary to this 
position, other theorists such as Duff contend that action should be understood from a 
communicative or nominalist perspective, as relative to our descriptions rather than 
discoverable in metaphysics - rejecting Moore’s theory of action in general, and therefore also 
in law.20 The problem here is that the VAR has become a paradigm within wider debates 
between competing philosophies of action, with little incentive for any side to analyse it as 
potentially special (severable) within the legal context. Legal commentators are then left to 
endorse whichever theory they find most compelling, and/or best suits their view of action in 
law.21 But in so doing, the legal commentator necessarily commits themselves to a certain 
comprehensive view of action in general – standing immediately in opposition to those who 
endorse competing theories, and significantly widening the target for critics of the VAR to 
include all integral elements of the wider theory. With this unappealing choice on offer, it is 
little wonder that we identified doctrinal disowning within the first trend.  
 The central purpose of this article is to counter both trends. The VAR must be 
compatible with philosophies of action and must answer to philosophical critique, but such 
answers need not themselves originate from a view of action outside of its criminal law context. 
The aim of this article, therefore, is to defend a conception of action in law (ie, voluntary bodily 
movement or omission) without anchoring that approach within any single comprehensive 
account of action in general. As will become clear, stripping back the VAR from wider theories 
of action provides us with a solid basis upon which to defend its descriptive identification (Part 
                                                          
19 Moore (n3 above). See also the highly influential work of Davidson (n3 above).  
20 Duff (n9 above) 94-97. 
21 L. Alexander and K. Ferzan, for example, tentatively endorse Davidson’s realist theory in Crime and 
Culpability (CUP, 2009) 229. 
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2), and to maintain its central normative role in establishing and tracing responsibility (Part 3). 
It should be acknowledged from the outset that competing definitions or variations of the VAR, 
originating from different theories of action, will generally promise considerably more in terms 
of normative pay-off than the conception defended in this article.22 The aim here is not to 
promise more, but to identify a defensible account of the VAR that can be confidently 
employed by courts and doctrinal commentators. This article arises from the context of a wide-
ranging attack on the VAR that is currently undermining its use.23       
 
PART 2. THE DESCRIPTIVE CHALLENGE: WHAT IS THE VAR? 
The descriptive challenge consists of two distinct but related limbs. First, if we are to define 
the VAR in terms of voluntary bodily movements and omissions, then we need to be able to 
explain and justify why this aspect of D’s agency has been singled out. We do this in Part 2A. 
Why focus on bodily movement and not the contraction of muscles for example, or in the 
opposite direction, more complex descriptions such as stabbing, shooting, driving and so on? 
Second, having justified a definition of the VAR centred on voluntary bodily movements and 
omissions, it is necessary to explain how such a definition works descriptively within the full 
range of current criminal offences. We do this in Part 2B. How does the absence of bodily 
movement describe omissions liability? And how can a focus on bodily actions/omissions 
describe offences of possession, status and vicarious liability? The preferred definition of the 
VAR must not be under-inclusive. The aim of Part 2 is to sketch and defend a stripped-back 
model of the VAR; to provide the descriptive grounding required for the normative goals 
discussed in Part 3.     
                                                          
22 Discussed in Part 3. 
23 The need for such an account is acknowledged in J. Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law (OUP, 
2016) 111-114; Sullivan (n17 above).   
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 When analysing both limbs of the descriptive challenge, and indeed the normative 
challenge in Part 3, an analytical separation will be made between the physical element (or 
actus reus) of the VAR, defined in terms of bodily movement/omission, and the mental element 
(or mens rea) of the VAR, defined in terms of voluntariness. This separation is not made in 
order to make any wider claims about action in philosophy,24 quite the opposite.25 As will be 
evident throughout, it is contended that separating the external and internal elements of the 
VAR, as we do for other criminal offences elements, can be analytically useful.  
 
Part 2a. Defining the VAR in terms of voluntary bodily movement and omission  
This article defends a stripped-back definition of the VAR centred on voluntary bodily 
movement and voluntary omissions as to bodily movement alone. It is contended that criminal 
liability can only be justified where it is demonstrated, as a necessary component of liability, 
that D voluntarily moved or omitted to move her body in a certain proscribed manner.   
 This definition draws considerably from standard metaphysical realist accounts of 
action.26 Within such wider accounts of action, bodily movement becomes the focus for 
analysis because it is identified as a form of ‘basic action’ at the root of all ‘complex act 
descriptions’ (ie, act descriptions including circumstances, results and intentions). For 
example, where Lucy is observed driving her car, her basic acts merely relate to the movement 
of her arms and legs, with all other aspects/descriptions of her complex action stemming from 
those basic movements. In this sense, as Davidson usefully coined, “we never do more than 
                                                          
24 See, Corrado (n8 above); Cf. M. Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law (OUP, 1997) 
315-318.   
25 See G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (Stevens, 1961) 14-15, where Williams critically identifies 
the fusing of conduct and mental elements within the VAR, observing its emergence from action theory.   
26 Described by J. Hornsby as the ‘standard story’ in the philosophy of action, ‘Agency and Action’ in J. Hyman 
& H. Stewart (eds.) Agency and Actions (2004) 1, 3. See also, A. Baier, ‘The Search for Basic Actions’ (1971) 
8(2) AmPhilQ 161.  
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move our bodies: the rest is up to nature.”27 Bodily movements (and omissions) promise a 
similar role within a criminal offence, providing the basic ingredient of responsible agency 
upon which more complex descriptions (elements of a criminal offence) may be constructed. 
For example, where Lucy causes death by dangerous driving,28 we may begin our analysis 
again with the basic movements of her arms and legs. From here, once it is established that 
Lucy performed those actions voluntarily, we may then ask more expansive questions about 
her state of mind at the time, the circumstances, and any results flowing from her actions. 
 Given the natural convergence between metaphysical realist views of basic action and 
the focus on bodily movement within accounts of the VAR (including the current account), it 
is little wonder that the two are often combined and/or conflated in analysis. Indeed, the 
discussion of basic action in philosophy is particularly useful as an explanation for the 
structural role of the VAR within a criminal offence. However, as highlighted in Part 1, we 
should take care not to conflate comprehensive accounts of action in general with voluntary 
conduct in crime, and doing so on even a descriptive level can be highly damaging – both in 
terms of added complexity, as well as exposure to criticism from competing theoretical 
accounts. We see this, for example, in the important debate about criteria for the identification 
of basic action in philosophy, a debate that has focused on bodily movement but has equal 
relevance to omissions.29 It is important to trace this debate to understand its relevance to the 
VAR.  
 In order to identify voluntary bodily movement as basic action within a comprehensive 
theory of action in philosophy, metaphysical realists must first provide the criteria for singling 
out this point within an event. What is special or unique about bodily movement? One possible 
                                                          
27 Davidson (n3 above) 59.  
28 An offence contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s1. 
29 As we explore below, identifying a criterion of basicness for omissions to move may be even more 
challenging.   
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answer holds that bodily movement is causally basic: it represents the starting point in a causal 
chain which opens to include complex descriptions. However, even leaving to one side debates 
about mental causation, it is difficult to maintain that bodily movement is physically causally 
basic, as it occurs only after various pre-movement processes (eg, various motor-function 
activity, the flexing of muscles, and so on).30 This places metaphysical realists on the horns of 
a dilemma. They could abandon bodily movement in favour of the more causally basic pre-
movement processes,31 but this would create potential for infinite regression and/or dissolution 
of action into neurophysiological processes that don’t seem to be actions, or active, at all. Or 
the metaphysical realist could maintain a focus on bodily movement by appealing to an 
additional criterion of basicness. One such criterion claims bodily movement as intentionally 
basic, that even if certain physical processes are causally basic to movement, the most basic 
thing we can intend is to move our body. But here again problems arise, because if we are 
focusing on consciously directed conduct, which we must to claim that pre-movement 
processes are not intended in the same way as bodily movements, then metaphysical realists 
must explain why people often act in complex ways that involve little or no conscious 
conception of the precise bodily movements involved (eg, tying laces, speaking, and so on).32 
 Where definitions of the VAR also identify bodily movement as the basis for D’s 
agency, it is easy to see why commentators have ascribed the same dilemma here as well. If 
our analysis of D’s agency and responsibility within the VAR must begin with bodily 
movement, then we also need criteria to establish and justify its identification. For 
communicative or nominalist action theorists, the lack of criteria identifying bodily movement 
                                                          
30 See, generally, Baier (n26 above); J. Annas, ‘How basic are basic actions?’ (1977) 78 ProArSoc 195, G.P. 
Fletcher, ‘The Act Requirement’ in The Grammar of Criminal Law (OUP, 2007) 266; Duff (n9 above) Ch. 9-11; 
Duff (n8 above) Ch. 5. 
31 Alternatively referred to as ‘volitions’. 
32 Moore and other realists have responded, highlighting the potential (even in lace tying etc.) for a person to 
consciously focus on her movements in a way that differs from pre-movement processes, or for this to have been 
the case during the learning of such movement. Moore (n3 above)161. Problems with this explanation are 
discussed in Duff (n9 above) 258-259.        
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should lead us to the rejection of any search for basic action in general as well as within the 
VAR, and the realisation that action rather exists as a product of wider observation, social 
perspective and description.33 And just like that, the proponent of the VAR is seemingly 
inevitably drawn into the philosophical debate, searching alongside metaphysical realists to 
defend the identification of bodily movement as basic (under some criterion) to action in 
general. The draw of this debate is not inevitable however. To justify the identification of 
voluntary bodily movements and omissions within the VAR a criterion of basicness is required, 
but this need not be interpreted as a search for basic action within a comprehensive theory of 
action in philosophy.34 By bracketing the wider debate and focusing on basic action within the 
criminal law context alone, it may be that the same criteria (causal and intentional basicness) 
can be employed in a new way.    
 Crucial to the identification of bodily movements and omissions at the core of the VAR, 
in this article, is the contention that such conduct is causally basic within the criminal law. For 
metaphysical realists, as we have seen, the claim that bodily movement is causally basic to 
action in general leads to a regression problem: limited only by our biological and 
psychological understandings of the human mind and body, it is difficult to justify the special 
status of bodily movement (as causally basic movement) as opposed to a range of pre-
movement processes. However, when defining action in the criminal law the problem of 
regression does not apply, or at least not in the same way. This is because, whether or not pre-
movement processes may be identified as action in general, they are not relevant points of 
engagement for criminal liability and therefore do not represent action in law. The criminal law 
engages with agents as they interact with the external world: interaction through the movement 
                                                          
33 See Duff (n9 above) 94-97; Annas (n30 above).  
34 Alexander and Ferzan highlight this point (n21 above) 229. See also Yaffe (n3 above) 174. 
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of their bodies, or interaction through the omission to move when required by law.35 The 
reasons why the criminal law waits for such interaction before being engaged are both 
practical36 and normative.37 Indeed, some of these reasons are central to the normative value of 
the VAR and will be discussed in Part 3. However, for present purposes it suffices to identify 
this descriptively distinctive aspect of criminal law engagement, recognising that it provides 
us with a criterion of causal basicness: the most basic criminally relevant thing that D can do 
is to move or omit to move her body.   
 Having established bodily movements and omissions as causally basic within the 
criminal law (grounding their identification within the VAR), it is not necessary, as it has been 
for metaphysical realists, to demonstrate that bodily conduct is also intentionally basic.38 
Rather, the descriptive burden within the VAR is simply to understand voluntariness in the 
context of bodily movements and omissions; to demonstrate that for all criminal events it is 
possible to identify and question this element of D’s offence. In this regard, we could interpret 
voluntariness in terms of consciously intended conduct, the result of conscious practical 
reasoning that accords with D’s beliefs and desires.39 However, despite the potential normative 
benefits of this approach in narrowing the criminal law, it does not meet the descriptive burden 
and must therefore be rejected: just because D’s conduct arises from reflex or habitual 
                                                          
35 As Ashworth has said, ‘To proceed to conviction without proof of a voluntary act would be to fail, in the most 
fundamental way, to show respect for individuals as rational, choosing beings. More generally, if people were 
liable to conviction despite doing nothing, or if something had been done to them, this would fail to respect their 
autonomy and would certainly not give them fair warning of the criminal sanction, unless reasonable duties had 
been made plain to them.’ A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, OUP, 1995) 95. The descriptive 
truth of this position is not new. See, for example, Stephen (n3 above) 97; Turner (n3 above) 26–27. 
36 D’s physical conduct places the potential offence in time and space (both crucial for the law), as well as 
providing a manifestation of D’s criminal choice. This later point is often related to evidential difficulties were 
such manifestation not required, including a problematic reliance on confession evidence. Williams (n25 above) 
2. Sullivan has related the point to Article 6 ECHR, G.R. Sullivan, ‘Parents and their Truanting Children: An 
English Lesson in Liability without Responsibility’ (2010) 12 OtLRev 285. 
37 Yaffe (n3 above) 175. See also Fletcher, who claims that criminal liability in the absence of an action or 
omission would amount to illegitimate state interference with the private realm, referring to the action 
requirement as a ‘buffer against overweening state power’. Fletcher (n30 above) 295. This argument may also 
be related to Duff’s conception of public wrongs. See Duff (n8 above). 
38 The difficulties of establishing intentional basicness are discussed in Duff (n9 above) 258-259.  
39 See Duff (n8 above) Ch5.  
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movement, for example, will not necessarily undermine liability,40 and similarly, when 
performing almost any complex action, it would be exceptional to do so by individually and 
consciously willing each bodily movement. Rather, a better approach is to focus on conduct 
that Davidson refers to as intentional “under some description”,41 or more appropriate to this 
discussion, voluntary under some description.42 As this approach explains, although basic 
conduct will rarely be consciously intended in its own right, we should still accept it as 
voluntary if it forms a component part of wider intentional action. For example, although Lucy 
may not focus on her individual hand movements when driving, such hand movements 
represent a voluntary component of her intentional driving, and are therefore voluntary under 
that description. Similarly, when performing a reflex or habitual movement, D’s conduct 
remains voluntary as a product of her agency, even where such movement was not consciously 
deliberated.  
 In demonstrating causal criteria for isolating voluntary bodily movements and 
omissions in the criminal context, and explaining the role of voluntariness, philosophical 
objections to the VAR have been avoided without reliance on a comprehensive theory of action 
in general. Indeed, by isolating our investigation of action to the criminal law context alone, it 
is further contended that our definition of action within the VAR need not be presented as in 
tension with those wider theories. This is perhaps most obvious in relation to metaphysical 
realist theories of action, with the focus on bodily conduct within the VAR mirroring much of 
their approach to action in general. But the VAR can also be interpreted consistently with 
                                                          
40 This point is discussed in Simester (n8 above) 407 & 421-422. 
41 Davidson (n3 above) 50-51. A similar approach is used within communicative explanations of intended 
conduct to account for multiple descriptions of the same act. See, R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal 
Liability (Blackwell, 1990) 89-91; Duff (n9 above) 310, Ch1.4 & 8.4.  
42 ‘Voluntary’ is preferred to recognise the difference between acting with an ‘intention’ to cause (ie, the 
paradigm of intention) and the component movements of the body. Voluntariness is also more apt to reflect 
degrees of bodily control, as well as to account for problem examples (eg, D who allows her body to be moved 
by another). For criticism of ‘intention’ in this context, see A.P. Simester, ‘Agency’ (1996) 15(2) Law&Phil 
159, 161 & 174.    
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nominalist or communicative theories of action as well. This is because, although such theories 
identify actions and events as expressed through multiple and potentially conflicting 
descriptions, they acknowledge the role of the law in defining abstract definitions that will 
capture multiple act descriptions. For example, Duff makes the following observation in 
relation to intentions and criminal attempts, 
 
An agent acts ‘with intent to commit an offence’ if the content of her intention is such that, 
given the context in which she forms and acts on it, she would necessarily commit an 
offence in carrying it out.43     
 
Within statements of this kind, there is acknowledgement of the vital separation between event 
descriptions in general and event definitions in law. Although D’s actions and intentions may 
be described in any number of ways (in line with nominalist theories), it remains acceptable 
for the law to identify a single abstracted definition and to ask whether those descriptions can 
be caught within it.44 Central to this article is the simple claim that this same legitimate 
abstraction can and should be extended to our legal understanding of the VAR: as long as it is 
wide enough to capture the various descriptions of action relevant to crime, then its use and 
definition may be accepted.    
 
Part 2b. Defining the VAR to avoid under-inclusivity 
                                                          
43 Duff (n9 above) 23.  
44 A further example from Duff can be seen in his discussion of duress: explaining that D may describe her 
actions in one way (eg, under compulsion and/or done to prevent harm), but that we may legally look within 
these descriptions to apply the legal definition of intention “on some level”. Duff (n41 above) 52-53.  
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Perhaps the most common criticism of the VAR is that it is descriptively under-inclusive, that 
several categories of offences do not include a VAR. Standard examples include omission 
offences, possession offences, vicarious or status offences, and thought offences. For those 
defending the VAR, each example must be either explained to include voluntary conduct, or 
presented as anomalous (and therefore criticised as an illegitimate or exceptional use of 
criminal law). We take each example in turn.  
 Central to almost every rejection of the VAR defined in terms of voluntary bodily 
movement is the apparent failure of such conceptions to account for omissions liability, a form 
of liability that is (increasingly) common across large and varied parts of the law. This criticism 
forces proponents of the VAR either to defend an unintuitive position in which omissions are 
presented as exceptions or even products of fiction,45 or to expand their definition of the VAR 
to include both bodily movements and omissions to move. This article opts for the latter 
approach, identifying the VAR in voluntary omissions to move as well as voluntary 
movements.46  
A focus on bodily movement within the VAR at the complete or partial exclusion of 
omissions is a mistake that has arisen in the literature via two routes, each of which is rejected 
here. First, where the VAR is grounded within a particular comprehensive theory of action in 
general, the treatment of omissions within that wider theory will necessarily influence 
definitions within the VAR. We see this with Moore, for example, who maintains complex 
distinctions in order to incorporate certain omissions as action,47 and is ultimately forced to 
explain large portions of the criminal law as illegitimate or exceptional.48 This challenge to a 
                                                          
45 Yaffe, for example, presents omissions as a form of legal fiction. Yaffe (n3 above) 176.  
46 This option is often avoided because of criticism that the VAR then becomes over-inclusive. This criticism is 
explored and rejected in Part 3. 
47 For example, between resisting (defined as action), refraining (defined as non-action), and omitting. Moore 
(n3 above) 87-88 & 273.  
48 Moore (n3 above) 34. Criticised in Corrado (n 8 above).  
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certain form of metaphysical realist account should not be taken as fatal to any realist account,49 
but provides clear illustration of how anchoring the VAR within a particular account of action 
can create additional burdens. A second route by which omissions have been excluded from 
definitions of the VAR arises by way of normative choice. What is meant by this (discussed 
variously below) is that commentators often overreach in their interpretations of the VAR, 
either in an effort to achieve certain normative ends (eg, trying to limit certain forms of 
omissions liability, such as those not manifesting criminality), or to criticise the VAR for not 
achieving such ends.50 It is contended that omissions, like movements, should be analysed 
through the VAR rather than excluded from it. Further narrowing of omissions liability can 
still be achieved through the tailoring of duties to act.  
 The next descriptive challenge for the VAR relates to possession offences, such as 
possession of illicit items and/or with wrongful intent. It was possible to avoid problems in 
relation to omissions through the explicit identification of non-movement within the VAR, but 
possession offences are more problematic. This is because the term possession does not appear 
to have a natural correlation to bodily conduct: liability seems to arise from D’s being in 
possession, not from a specific movement or non-movement. Despite this lack of natural 
correlation, however, it is clear that possession offences can be interpreted in line with the 
VAR.51 If we ask what D has done wrong in such cases, it is still possible to point to her initial 
acts in gaining possession, or (often more appropriately52) to her omissions in not divesting 
herself of that possession.53  
                                                          
49 See B. Vermazen, ‘Negative Acts’ in B. Vermazen & B. Hintikka (eds.) Essays on Davidson (OUP, 1985) 
93–104. Davidson largely accepts this approach, see D. Davidson, ‘Reply to Bruce Vermazen’, 217–21. 
50 For criticism of the VAR’s failure to meet this inappropriate goal, see Fletcher (n8 above); S. Morse, 
‘Culpability and Control’ (1993) 142 UPalLRev 1587, 1649-1650.      
51 See generally G. Yaffe, ‘In Defence of Criminal Possession’ (2016) CrimL&Phil 441. 
52 The omissions within a possession will usually spread over a longer spell of time, and so are more likely to 
correspond with other offence elements.  
53 This approach has been accepted for several decades: Williams (n25 above) 8. See Simester et al, Simester 
and Sullivan’s Criminal Law (6th ed, Bloomsbury, 2016) 87-88.   
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When identifying voluntary conduct within any offence, including possession offences, 
it is important to remember that we are locating an essential ingredient for criminal liability, 
but not necessarily a sufficient one.54 It is not suggested that D’s voluntary movement or non-
movement alone provides an account or determinative marker of appropriate criminalisation. 
Thus, for example, where D is unaware that she is in possession of an illicit item (eg, because 
it has been slipped into her bag), we can agree with Husak that criminalising this possession 
would be normatively undesirable, whilst maintaining that D satisfies the conduct element of 
the possession offence (ie, she is voluntarily omitting to move her body in a way that would 
divest her of the item). Husak criticises such accounts as “strained”, maintaining that the role 
of the VAR is to deny liability in cases of this kind.55 But this is to require too much of the 
VAR. The unaware possessor does not deserve liability, not because her omission is 
involuntary, but because of her lack of knowledge as to what she possesses. 
 The next two offence categories, vicarious and status offences, should be approached 
in a similar way to possession offences. As with possession offences, liability based on the 
actions of another (vicarious liability) and liability based on membership or position (status 
offences) do not appear to correlate naturally with an analysis focused on bodily conduct. 
However, again, in both cases, it should always be possible to ask what D has done to create 
the vicarious relationship or to assume the status, or what D has failed to do to divest herself 
of either. Where the answer to these questions is that D has done something apparently innocent 
and perhaps largely unconnected with the mischief of the offence charged, then this is a basis 
upon which to challenge the normative acceptability of the offence at issue.56 We see this, for 
example, in strict liability offences for parents whose children fail to attend school regularly, 
                                                          
54 Discussed in Part 3. 
55 D. Husak, ‘Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?’ in R.A. Duff (ed.) Philosophy and the Criminal Law 
(CUP, 1998) 60, 71.  
56 Discussed in Part 3.  
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where the offence can be made out in the absence of present failures in parenting (ie, D does 
not need to have done or failed to do anything that has culpably contributed to her child’s 
absence).57 However, again, it is important to distinguish this normative challenge from a 
descriptive one. Although we can and should challenge the apparent absence of a culpable act 
(discussed further in Part 3C), it is still possible to describe actions that have given rise to the 
vicarious relationship, and so the VAR defended in this article remains descriptively accurate.   
 The final group, pure thought offences, provides the only categorical descriptive 
counter-example to the VAR. Pure thought offences would criminalise D in the absence of any 
related bodily conduct, for example, for forming an intention to commit terrorist acts. However, 
such offences are exceptional, and should be criticised as illegitimate. In England and Wales, 
the only example remains the archaic treason offence of compassing or imagining the death of 
the king,58 an offence that has not been applied for many decades (and never, to this writer’s 
knowledge, in its pure thought based construction). Offences exist which primarily focus on 
D’s mens rea to establish the targeted mischief, and inchoate offences, including specific 
inchoate offences targeting terrorist planning, are obvious examples of these. However, such 
offences still require voluntary conduct from D; they are not pure thought offences. We can 
highlight any disconnect in such offences between D’s conduct and mens rea as part of a 
normative critique, discussed in Part 3, but the descriptive challenge is still met. Therefore, 
although pure thought offences would provide a descriptive counter-example to the VAR, 
concessions to the definition defended here are not necessary.59       
 
                                                          
57 See Sullivan (n36 above); and, more generally, Sullivan (n17 above). Sullivan’s analysis is useful, but he is 
also guilty of overreaching in his interpretation of the VAR, interpreting it as a link between D and the wrongs 
of an offence (ie, going beyond voluntary conduct alone).   
58 The Treason Act 1351, II. 
59 Cf Husak (n55 above) 86-90.  
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PART 3. THE NORMATIVE CHALLENGE: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE VAR?  
Having provided a defence to the descriptive challenge in Part 2, and avoided problems of 
under-inclusivity, the danger is that the VAR so-defined will be stripped of its normative 
content. As Corrado cautions: 
 
The act requirement now seems to come to this: No one can be punished unless she either 
moves or fails to move her body. That may seem to be an empty requirement (who could 
fail to satisfy it?).60  
 
This new perception of over-inclusivity provides an alternative basis upon which to reject the 
VAR. For those adopting this position, a normative rejection of the VAR is either an end in 
itself, opens the possibility for the formation of a different VAR,61 or becomes the foundation 
for a new (more normatively rich) requirement based on control for example,62 or agency.63 
Under these alternatives to the VAR, rather than focusing on D’s bodily movements and 
omissions, we are encouraged to examine D’s authorship of the criminal mischief, her ability 
to have changed the course of events for which she is being blamed. Such alternatives encounter 
major problems of their own of course, both descriptive and normative, but their ambition is 
appealing.64     
 In response to this line of criticism, it is important to understand the terms of the debate. 
We can agree with critics of the VAR that a general theory of justified criminalisation would 
                                                          
60 Corrado (n8 above) 1541. 
61 This was true of Corrado, for example.  
62 Husak (n55 above); Husak (n8 above). 
63 S. Dimock, ‘Intoxication and the Act/Control/Agency Requirement’ (2012) 6(3) CrimL&Phil 341.  
64 Duff, for example, having earlier expressed some support for the control requirement, has latterly rejected it 
as insufficiently clear. See Duff (n8 above) 72 & Ch5.  
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be beneficial for the criminal law, helping us to understand the correct boundaries of the law, 
and restraining against the creep of over-criminalisation.65 We can also agree (if we wish) with 
critics of the VAR that metaphysical realist theories of action such as that espoused by Moore 
do not capture the true meaning of action in general.66 However, in both cases, such agreement 
need not lead us to a rejection of the VAR as defined and defended in this article, particularly 
as neither critique offers something substantively viable and descriptively accurate in return. 
There is a burden to demonstrate the normative value of the VAR, but overstretching this 
burden (either in support or in critique) is counterproductive. Thus, for example, the discussion 
of the VAR that follows will not claim that it can define the acceptable limits of criminalisation 
beyond a minimum requirement;67 will not claim that D’s conduct within the VAR must be 
independently wrongful;68 will not claim that the VAR captures the difference between actions 
and omissions;69 and will not claim that the VAR will always provide evidence of mens rea as 
to offence circumstances or results.70 The risk with ambitions of this sort is that, when they 
cannot be met, the baby is discarded with the bathwater. Instead, we must focus on what the 
baby can do, and why it is worth protecting.      
 In setting out the normative value of the VAR, it is also necessary to resist, at least 
partially, the binary separation commentators have made between the VAR as a ‘condition’ of 
criminalisation (among others), or as the ‘object’ of criminalisation (representing the central 
criminal mischief).71 It is contended here that such descriptions do not stand in opposition, and 
                                                          
65 Indeed, without an accepted theory of criminalisation, it is impossible to understand what over-criminalisation 
is.  
66 See, for example, Duff (n9 above) Part 3; G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (OUP, 2000) 434-438.    
67 Defining the acceptable limits of the criminal law is a separate, and ongoing, search.  
68 Whilst a full offence must criminalise a wrong to be normatively justified, there is no reason why this must be 
independently true of the act element any more than any other element of the full offence.  
69 For criticism of the VAR in this regard, see Fletcher (n8 above).  
70 For criticism of the VAR in this regard, see Duff (n41 above) Ch6. Yaffe overreaches, therefore, when he 
contends that the VAR must “manifest a mental state”. Yaffe (n3 above)184-189.  
71 See, for example, R.A. Duff, ‘Action and Criminal Responsibility’ in T. O’Connor & C. Sandis (eds.) A 
Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Blackwell, 2010) 331, 332.   
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may both apply to the VAR. However, care must be taken. Although a strong representation 
will and should be made for the VAR as a necessary normative condition of liability, its 
description as the object of liability must be more restrained. It is not claimed here that the 
VAR alone can tell us the acceptable limits of criminalisation. However, in combination with 
all other offence elements, the VAR will still represent a constituent part of the object or 
mischief targeted by an offence, and one we must take time to understand. And beyond this, 
and perhaps more importantly, the VAR can also provide the key to unlock D’s responsibility 
for a full offence description. D’s voluntary conduct, her most basic interaction with the 
external world, provides the basis for an essential nexus of agency between D and other 
elements of her offence: causally linking her to proscribed results, and/or linking her with 
criminal circumstances and mens rea.72 Far from a simple condition, therefore, the VAR 
becomes the essential gateway through which we may legitimately blame D for her conduct, 
and for the full criminal mischief, with that mischief represented by the full offence description.  
 The normative value of the VAR is thus identified both in its role as a condition of 
liability, as well as through its nexus forming between the wider elements of an offence. Both 
aspects are essential when we analyse the application of an offence in practice: we must be 
satisfied with the way courts are applying requirements for conduct and voluntariness, as well 
as applying rules relating to the nexus between D’s voluntary conduct and other offence 
elements (eg, rules of causation, coincidence, and so on). Beyond this, both aspects of the VAR 
are also essential (or should be essential) to the way we evaluate offences and/or within reform 
discussions. When analysing and evaluating an offence it is important to assess the specific 
construction of each element, the level and target of required mens rea, the factual matrix of 
circumstances, the threshold for any results, and so on. However, for these elements to be tied 
                                                          
72 The potential to trace D’s agency from her voluntary bodily conduct is aptly described by Davidson as an 
“accordion effect”. Davidson (n3 above) 54. 
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back to D, to be blamed on D, this relies on the VAR, on what D voluntarily did or failed to do 
in relation to those wider elements. Therefore, the legitimacy of the law’s claim to blame D for 
the object of an offence (ie, for the full offence description), is necessarily dependent upon both 
the identification of voluntary conduct and upon the adequacy of any nexus between that 
conduct and other offence elements.    
The normative role of the VAR is therefore more complex and nuanced than simple 
condition or object, and requires further unpacking. In what follows, the role of the VAR within 
the attribution of criminal agency and responsibility is explored across three sections. The first 
two sections identify and discuss the role of the VAR in restricting certain forms of 
criminalisation: first the condition that all legitimate offences must include a requirement of 
act or omission (Part 3A), and second that such conduct must be voluntary (Part 3B). These 
restrictions do not amount to a theory of acceptable criminalisation, but should still be 
recognised as important limitations within the law. Finally, we explore the necessary 
implication of the VAR that all criminal offences must include an identifiable and justifiable 
nexus between the VAR and other offence elements (Part 3C). The nature and extent of this 
nexus is a matter of normative debate, but it is a debate that should be central to the evaluation 
of criminal offences, and a debate that demonstrates the full utility and essential role of the 
VAR.     
 
Part 3a. All criminal offences must include a requirement of bodily conduct 
The first restriction imposed by the VAR is perhaps the most obvious, that all legitimate 
criminal offences must include criminal conduct (ie, a bodily act or omission). Such conduct 
is the only way a person can influence the external/public world, and therefore represents the 
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essential root though which we may blame D for a complex criminal event.73 Where an offence 
requires certain results to be demonstrated, it must be possible to trace those results back to D’s 
criminally basic conduct as a cause; and where an offence requires certain circumstances or 
mens rea, it must be possible to show that such circumstances or mens rea are accompanied by 
D’s conduct. Such conduct will standardly have the additional role of locating the potential 
offence in time and in space,74 though this need not always be the case.75       
 A critical response to this requirement should correctly highlight its limited role in 
restricting criminalisation. This criticism should not be overstated: the fact that we are always 
either moving or not moving does not mean that the requirement of bodily conduct within the 
VAR will always be satisfied. This is because, of course, when we look at criminal offences 
they do not proscribe all conduct, but rather focus on movements or omissions that cause 
particular results, or specific conduct accompanied by certain mens rea or in certain 
circumstances. For example, voluntary omissions only become criminally relevant when 
contravening a legal duty to act. In this way, conduct relevant to the criminal law is not all 
encompassing, but often very specific.76 However, critics would be correct to highlight that a 
requirement of bodily conduct does not prevent the creation of offences with extremely wide 
or trivial act elements in the future, for example “doing anything whilst intending to kill”.77 
Such an offence would not contradict this part of the VAR. However, as we discuss further in 
Part 3C, the VAR may still provide the best route to understand and highlight what is wrong 
with hypothetical offences of this kind.  
                                                          
73 This does not, however, require voluntary conduct to be explicitly discussed in every case before the court, 
any more than other essential requirements (eg, the D is 10 year old or over). It simply means that the element 
should always be discussed where it is potentially lacking. Cf Duff (n9 above) 251. 
74 Moore (n3 above) 3 & 289.  
75 For example, for complicity liability, and for liability constructed upon doctrines of prior fault, D’s conduct is 
likely to be identified some time before the offence is constituted.  
76 It is not a criticism, therefore, to say that D is not omitting to do X (criminally relevant conduct) because she 
is doing Y (not criminally relevant conduct). Cf. Fletcher (n8 above) 1452.  
77 Discussed in A.P. Simester, ‘Structure and Function in Criminal Law’ [Review] (1998) 57(3) CLJ 616, 617. 
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 Although the VAR can be satisfied by any voluntary act or omission, it would be wrong 
to represent even this aspect of the VAR as trivial. The identification of D’s conduct is still 
essential for us to investigate D’s agency in relation to the full offence description; to 
understand what D did wrong. And even if it is possible to design an offence that satisfies the 
element in only a minimal way, it remains true that certain forms of illegitimate criminalisation 
are categorically excluded. Thus, for example, the VAR rules out the potential for pure thought 
offences (eg, ‘forming an intention to kill’), or pure status offences (eg, ‘having naturally blond 
hair’),78 and any other offence construction where D’s conduct is irrelevant.     
 
Part 3b. All criminal offences must include a requirement of voluntariness 
The second restriction imposed by the VAR is that, for all legitimate criminal offences, D’s 
bodily movements or omissions must be performed voluntarily. Although the requirement of 
criminally relevant bodily conduct can physically tie D to other elements of her offence within 
the external world, the voluntariness of such conduct remains an essential condition if we are 
to legitimately raise questions about D’s responsibility. This is not to say that whenever D 
completes voluntary conduct leading to a particular harm then D will or should be responsible 
for that harm. Rather, it is contended that where D’s conduct is not voluntary then she is not 
responsible for it, and the basis for allocating blame for the more complex offence description 
is undermined.79 D’s criminal agency and impact on the world must be voluntarily performed 
before any legitimate questions of blame can arise. 
                                                          
78 Note that the status offences discussed in Part 2B were not “pure” status offences because they relied on D’s 
conduct in gaining or retaining the status.  
79 This will be the case for all offences, even those constructed on D’s prior fault, where such prior fault must be 
established through voluntary conduct.  
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 To make normative sense of the voluntariness requirement, however, we must first take 
some time to understand its construction. Within Part 2A, we were able to free this question 
from a raft of philosophical constraints: where the VAR is located within a metaphysical realist 
conception of action, for example, the definition of voluntariness is commonly restricted by 
the role it is required to play in identifying bodily conduct as intentionally basic. Freed from 
such restrictions, we have defined voluntariness within the VAR more expansively to include 
all movements where D maintains deliberative control, where D’s conduct is ‘voluntary under 
some description’. This approach is useful because it allows us to describe voluntary conduct 
as it is experienced, not necessarily as a set of individually and consciously willed bodily 
movements, but as a complex intentional event. The VAR must then look within this complex 
event to identify D’s bodily conduct, and to assess whether this conduct was performed as a 
component of the voluntary or intentional whole.80 When moving her body, or when omitting,81 
D must have been able to choose to act differently had she so intended.82  
Given the role of voluntariness in opening the door to potential criminal responsibility, 
in telling us when D is the agent of her bodily movements and omissions, several commentators 
have contended that the law should require more than the relatively expansive definition 
provided above. For example, the VAR could include a stipulation that D must have had a 
freedom in her choice, for an absence of physical or mental duress.83 The headlines within these 
approaches can be convincing, calling for the narrowing of liability to only those who engage 
freely in criminal conduct. However, it is contended that conditions of this kind, to the extent 
that they should be incorporated within the criminal law, are more appropriately defined and 
                                                          
80 Where D’s conduct does not form part of an intentional complex event (eg, D simply moves here body 
absentmindedly), the question is whether such conduct was within her rational control.    
81 D’s omission to resist another person moving her body is included here.  
82 This does not mean that D must have been able to act differently, just that she must have been able to choose 
to do so. See, Simester (n8 above) 419-423. 
83 This is true for Husak, for example, who interprets a “control” requirement to question the voluntariness and 
responsibility of those addicted to certain drugs. Husak (n55 above) 77-82.   
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applied as defences (as they are within the current law): accepting that D has voluntarily acted, 
has possibly caused harm, but may be excused for that conduct as a result of surrounding 
circumstances. To claim that D does not act voluntarily in circumstances of duress, for 
example, seems counterintuitive, it is simply that we understand (and sympathise) with her 
choices.     
 A further example of overstatement can be found in several critiques of one of the 
leading cases said to exemplify a lack of voluntary conduct: Larsonneur.84 In this case, D was 
convicted of being found in the United Kingdom without permission, and yet it was an accepted 
fact that D was only in the United Kingdom because she had been brought into the country 
against her will by police. This case is correctly criticised in terms of liability being found, but 
it is contended that such criticism should not focus on a lack of voluntary conduct. When 
entering the United Kingdom, D’s bodily conduct was voluntarily performed, she was not 
picked up and carried.85 D’s conduct was encouraged, perhaps even coerced by the police, but 
(in line with the discussion of ‘freedom’ above) the relevance of this should be for potential 
defences or entrapment. This is not to endorse the decision in Larsonneur, but to clarify that 
the case is objectionable because of the role of the police in forcing D to act in an illegal way, 
not because her bodily conduct was involuntary.  
 In the process of resisting overstatements of this kind, the normative role of the 
voluntariness requirement within the VAR can appear diminished. But in reality, the opposite 
is true. As discussed in Part 1, the problem with current uncertainties and overstatements about 
the VAR is that they lead to uncertain application and weaken the fundamental principles at 
play. This is certainly true of the voluntariness requirement as it is applied within the 
                                                          
84 149 L.T.R. 542 (1933). Criticised for its failure to adhere to the VAR in Williams (n25 above) 11, a position 
standardly adopted within criminal law textbooks.   
85 As was the case in Martin v State (31 Ala.App.334 (1994)), where D’s conviction was quashed. Cf Winzar v 
Chief Constable of Kent, The Times, 28 March 1983. 
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substantive current law. The voluntariness requirement within the VAR provides an essential 
condition for responsibility; provides the route through which we can attribute D’s bodily 
movements and omissions to her as a moral agent, and through which other offence elements 
may be linked back to D. However, as the substantive criminal law has struggled to clarify and 
define this requirement, it has been largely avoided and recast within the ‘defence’ of 
automatism.86 The debate has thereby been shifted from defining voluntariness as an essential 
ingredient of legitimate criminal blame, to defining involuntariness as a route to exculpation. 
This shift within the substantive law continues to weaken the VAR.  
 The current ‘defence’ of automatism is deeply problematic in two related respects: its 
uncertain equivalence to involuntariness, and its threshold for application. On the first of these, 
despite automatism standardly being referred to as a defence, it is clear that this cannot be the 
case.87 Where voluntariness is essential to criminal responsibility, then its absence results in a 
lack of inculpation (ie, the VAR) and it is therefore illogical to speak of an exculpating defence. 
What we might label as the defence of automatism is more accurately presented as the negation 
of an element within the VAR; but one with uncertain scope. Automatism could be interpreted 
simply as synonymous with involuntariness,88 which would represent the clearest way forward, 
but also exposes the use of the term as unnecessary. Or, as is perhaps more common, we could 
interpret automatism as a subset of involuntariness applicable to those who lack consciousness 
for example, but not to those physically manipulated by others.89 This latter interpretation 
provides a distinction from the wider term involuntariness, but it is a distinction that can only 
confuse things further: it begs questions about why automatic involuntariness requires separate 
                                                          
86 J.J. Child & A. Reed, ‘Automatism is never a defence’ (2014) 65 NILQ 167. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Bratty v AG for NI [1963] AC 386. 
89 D. Ormerod & K. Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Criminal Law (15th Ed, 2018) 307: “Someone is an 
automaton or in a state of automatism where his conscious mind is dissociated from that part of the mind which 
controls action.” 
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identification, and whether prior-fault rules for example can and should apply consistently.90 
These debates confuse the law with no tangible benefits.  
 Stemming from the uncertain status of automatism, the second ‘threshold problem’ is 
more pertinent to our current concerns. The issue here is that having relocated discussion of 
involuntariness to the ‘defence’ of automatism, the common law in jurisdictions such as 
England and Wales has interpreted and evolved the rules as if they apply to exculpate a 
defendant from wrongdoing (ie, as a defence). Alongside many common law defences, the 
automatism rules have been narrowed considerably in recent years. This is perhaps best 
illustrated in Lord Justice Hughes’ leading judgment in Coley,91 where a potential defence of 
automatism was rejected on the facts. In Coley, D physically assaulted his neighbour whilst 
experiencing what doctors described as a “brief psychotic episode”, meaning that at the point 
of attack D had no conscious or rational control over his movement. However, reflecting upon 
the complex movements performed by D during this episode, the court rejected the potential 
application of automatism, and rejected an involuntariness description.92 
 
[D’s] mind may well, if the doctors were right, have been affected by delusions or 
hallucinations and in that sense his detachment from reality might be described by some 
as an absence of conscious action. Such condition, however, clearly falls short of 
involuntary, as distinct from irrational, action. . . . [T]he defendant would, despite their 
hypothesis or psychotic episode, have been capable of complex organised behaviour. It is 
plain that a person acting under a delusion may act in such a way, and clearly this defendant 
                                                          
90 Prior-fault rules have developed with reference to automatism, but it would be hard to justify why prior-fault 
leading to non-automatic involuntariness should be treated differently.  
91 [2013] EWCA Crim 223. Discussed in R. Mackay, ‘Case comment: R v Coley; R v McGhee; R v Harris’ 
(2013) CrimLR 923. 
92 Note that the comments here do not engage with the separate issue of prior fault, in this case relating to D’s 
voluntary intoxication.  
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did. . . . The doctor said ‘He is conscious in a way but it is conscious in the belief that he 
is a character [in a computer game]. He does not have an awareness of what he is doing.’ 
That is a description of irrational behaviour, with a deluded or disordered mind, but it is 
not a description of wholly involuntary action.93 
 
It is contended that the decision and analysis in Coley only makes sense if we consider 
automatism as a defence, asking what conditions D must satisfy to avoid liability for the crime 
he has committed (ie, was his conduct justified or excusable?). Once we recognise automatism 
as a synonym of involuntariness (or as a sub-set of involuntariness) then we also recognise that 
what is at play is not a defence, but rather the voluntariness requirement within the VAR. This 
recasts the question to one of inculpation: was D responsible for the movements of his body; 
was he in sufficient deliberative control to be held responsible for the harms that occurred? 
Recasting the question in this manner, it would be extraordinary for a court to find irrational 
conduct performed without awareness as sufficient grounding for liability.94 In this manner, 
clarification and restatement of the voluntariness requirement within the VAR can serve a 
crucial normative end, and perhaps (it is suggested) lead us away from discussion of 
automatism entirely.  
   
Part 3c. All criminal offences must include a nexus between D’s VAR and other elements  
Within this final section of Part 3 we explore the role that can be played by the VAR in 
understanding and determining the relationship between offence elements. The role of the VAR 
                                                          
93 Para 24. 
94 Compare the US case of People v Newton (87 Cal.Rptr. 394 (1970)) where similar complex movement to that 
in Coley was nevertheless held to be involuntary, with the court focusing on the minimum requirements for 
responsibility. Discussed in Yaffe (n3 above). 
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as a nexus between D and a full offence description has already been highlighted, locating D’s 
relevant impact on the world, providing a causal root to more complex action, and so on. 
However, it is important to provide some more detail about the precise (potential) benefits of 
the VAR in forcing us to consider this relationship/nexus with other offence elements more 
thoroughly. We may begin with what D has done (the VAR), but must now expand from this, 
asking whether and to what extent this doing should be criminally blamed, in light of its results, 
the surrounding circumstances and mens rea.95 It is contended that exploring the nexus between 
the VAR and other offence elements provides the best route through which to analyse and 
evaluate the criminal law, as well as the best route through which to begin to construct a theory 
of legitimate criminalisation. 
 A note of caution is required; this section does not attempt to build a theory of legitimate 
criminalisation. However, it does aim to demonstrate the vital role and utility of the VAR 
within such an endeavour. In order to understand the full benefits of a clearly defined VAR in 
this regard, it is useful to distinguish two areas of discussion. First, an outline of the descriptive 
benefits of the VAR in explaining the nexus between offence elements, and understanding 
complex offence constructions. Second, an exploration of the benefits of the VAR in debating 
and understanding the normative dimensions of the nexus, looking squarely to debates about 
the boundaries of legitimate criminalisation, and about what such a nexus should require.    
Understanding the nexus between offence elements  
Before we discuss the normative aspects of offence construction, it is important to first outline 
the role that can be played by a clearly defined VAR in describing and analysing the law. At 
the root of every criminal offence, the VAR (or conduct element) provides the essential starting 
                                                          
95 D’s responsibility can also be assessed in the opposite direction, beginning with the complex act description, 
as is more standard within courtroom discussion. However, the root of D’s responsibility remains the same.  
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point for description and analysis of a full offence. Where an offence includes a result element, 
for example, it must be demonstrated that D’s conduct was causally related to that result; where 
there are circumstances and mens rea, these must standardly coincide and correspond with D’s 
conduct, and so on. Separating offences into elements in this fashion provides a host of 
analytical benefits, allowing offences to be dissected and discussed in stages, and has been the 
subject of an extensive scholarship.96 It is a model of element analysis that has been explicitly 
endorsed and adopted within the US Model Penal Code.97 It is also, crucially, a model of 
element analysis that relies upon a clearly defined conduct element, from which other offence 
elements can be identified.98 This is an important role for the VAR and should not be 
underplayed. Indeed, for commentators such as Yaffe, the role of the VAR in locating offence 
elements and making sense of the correspondence between elements is the primary purpose for 
its identification.99   
 Within uncodified jurisdictions such as England and Wales, no single model of analysis 
is officially adopted, and courts and commentators have remained sceptical about the merits of 
element analysis (ie, the analytical separation of conduct, circumstances and results). Chiefly, 
this scepticism has focused on the seeming inability of the advocates of element analysis to 
demonstrate how each element can be objectively identified and separated within an offence.100 
This scepticism culminated in the explicit rejection of element analysis by the Law 
Commission as a model for structuring offences in the 1970/80s.101 However, first within the 
                                                          
96 Led by Paul Robinson. See, eg, P. Robinson & J. Grall, ‘Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: 
The Model Penal Code and Beyond’ (1983) 35 StanLR 681.       
97 US MPC §2.02.   
98 Robinson (n3 above) Ch2. Robinson advocates a more complex scheme of offence elements that I would not 
endorse, but D’s conduct remains the central nexus point.   
99 Yaffe (n3 above). See also, R. Gainer, ‘The Culpability Provisions of the Model Penal Code’ (1987) 19 RutLJ 
575. 
100 See, for example, R. Buxton, ‘The Problem with Reckless Attempts’ (1983) CrimLR 365; ‘Circumstances, 
Consequences and Attempted Rape’ (1984) CrimLR 25; R.A. Duff, ‘The Circumstances of an Attempt’ (1990) 
50(1) CLJ 100.   
101 Law Commission, Attempt, and Impossibility in relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement (Law Com 
No 102, 1980) [2.12]. 
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1989 Draft Criminal Code, and then later within a series of more recent reports on the inchoate 
offences of attempt, conspiracy and assisting and encouraging, the Commission has reversed 
its earlier position and adopted element analysis as a model for its discussion and reform 
recommendations.102 Stemming from these recommendations, the Serious Crime Act 2007 has 
now incorporated much of the Commission’s work on assisting and encouraging into law,103 
and the courts have taken a similar approach for attempts liability.104 The ability to separate 
and discuss elements within inchoate offences, and in particular the elements of an offence 
within D’s ulterior mens rea, has been vital in order to articulate desired policy changes.105 
However, crucially for current purposes, the Commission and the courts have not refuted the 
previous criticisms of imprecision, which have continued to undermine the effective use of 
element analysis.106  
 Whether we are using element analysis to understand the elements of a standard 
offence, or whether we are analysing a more complex offence involving ulterior mens rea, it is 
clear that the precision and objectiveness of our separation of elements is all important. For 
critics and advocates alike, it is recognised that such precision and objectivity can only be 
achieved through a clearly defined VAR. The stripped-back approach outlined in this article 
promises that definition.  
How should offence elements relate to the VAR?    
                                                          
102 See, Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales: Volume 2 Commentary on Draft Criminal 
Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) [13.44]-[13.45]; Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime 
(Law Com No 300, 2006); Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009). 
103 Serious Crime Act 2007, Part 2. See, J.J. Child, ‘Exploring the Mens Rea Requirements of the Serious Crime 
Act 2007 Assisting and Encouraging Offences’ (2012) 76 JCrimL 220. 
104 See, Khan [1990] 1 WLR 813. This case requires D to have a particular mens rea towards the circumstance 
element of the offence she is attempting, thus relying on the analytical separation of elements.  
105 Discussed in J.J. Child, ‘The Structure, Coherence and Limits of Inchoate Liability: The New Ulterior 
Element’ LS 34(4) (2014) 537.  
106 The Serious Crime Act 2007 Part 2 offences, for example, have been criticised by a number of 
commentators. See, for example, D. Ormerod and R. Fortson, ‘Serious Crime Act 2007: The Part 2 Offences’ 
[2009] CrimLR 389. 
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The existence of a VAR as the root of D’s agency implies the requirement of a nexus between 
D’s conduct and other offence elements. We have discussed how this can be understood in 
descriptive terms. However, what does it mean in a normative sense? For example, beyond a 
causal relationship with results, what does it mean to have a nexus of agency between D’s 
conduct and circumstances or mens rea? Surely a requirement of simple temporal coincidence 
is insufficient as the basis for deserved associative blame?  
 These questions are difficult to answer with any certainty, and it is a difficulty that has 
given rise to criticism of the VAR defined in terms of voluntary bodily conduct alone. Take 
the following example from Husak: 
 
Suppose legislators in a given jurisdiction … propose a new statute that defined treason as 
‘compassing the death of the king.’ One legislator, especially adept at criminal theory, 
objects to this new statute on the ground that it violates the act requirement. In order to 
mollify his concerns, the legislators agree to amend the statute to include an additional 
clause that allows liability to be imposed only on persons who had performed the act of 
eating at the same time prior to the moment at which they compassed the death of the 
king.107  
 
The point being made in this example is that, although the VAR can be used to object to thought 
offences and pure status offences,108 such offences can simply be redrafted to satisfy the VAR 
by including non-relevant voluntary conduct: the offence remains equally objectionable, and 
yet the VAR is satisfied. This being the case, the argument continues, the VAR (defined in 
                                                          
107 Husak (n55 above) 67-68. A similar point is noted by Simester (n77 above).  
108 See discussion in Part 3A.  
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relation of voluntary movement) cannot perform its task of restricting illegitimate 
criminalisation.     
 In order to meet this challenge head on, it is necessary to provide further concrete 
requirements detailing the nexus between the VAR and other offence elements. There are 
several examples in the literature that can be used for this purpose. We might say, for example, 
that the VAR must provide a contribution towards the central criminal mischief of the 
offence,109 or that it must in some way manifest D’s criminal intention.110 Indeed, theories of 
agency and control, often presented as alternatives to the VAR, may be better applied to this 
task. In attempting to provide an alternative to the VAR, agency and control theories are 
legitimately criticised for lacking clear causal roots; for neglecting the crucial role of actions 
in manifesting D’s agency and control.111 Accepting a role for the VAR provides essential 
grounding for such theories, and allows us to recast them as potential expositions of the nexus 
between the VAR other offence elements. The analysis of fine-grained variations between these 
theories, and decisions about precisely which should be preferred, lays outside the boundaries 
of this article; and perhaps outside the boundaries of necessity for the substantive criminal 
law.112 However, some coarse-grained analysis is useful.   
 At its minimum, a coarse-grained approach to the nexus between the VAR and other 
offence elements should require courts and commentators to identify how and why criminal 
harms are attributable to D as products or corollaries of her voluntary action. This approach 
will not straightforwardly prevent the creation of objectionable offences that include a 
requirement of voluntary conduct; but a focus on the VAR and nexus between elements can be 
instrumental in exposing why offences of this kind should be rejected. For example, 
                                                          
109 This approach is adopted in Sullivan (n17 above). 
110 This approach is adopted in Yaffe (n3 above) 183-189. 
111 See critique in Duff (n8 above) Ch 3.  
112 It is highly unlikely that our legal system will endorse a particular fine-grained theory of agency or control.    
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criminalising the bare intention of ‘compassing the death of the king’ is not simply illegitimate 
because it does not include a conduct requirement, and it is clear that an unrelated voluntary 
conduct requirement does not legitimise such an offence. However, being forced to identify 
the voluntary conduct within an offence leads us to question what link there is between such 
conduct and (in this case) mens rea, and it is the absence of any nexus here that exposes our 
concerns. When we ask what D has done in relation to this intention that makes it a legitimate 
target of the criminal law, any answer relating to her breakfast is clearly inadequate: inadequate 
not because voluntary conduct does not matter, but precisely because it does. 
 This form of evaluation, focusing on the role of the VAR in linking the elements of an 
offence, is not simply useful in relation to extreme hypotheticals of the kind just discussed, but 
can help us to understand legitimate objections to a range of controversial offences within the 
current law. This covers offences like the hypothetical where D’s conduct does not relate to 
other elements of her offence at all, but also offences where the relationship is diminished by 
time or context. This includes, for example, vicarious liability offences, where we must trace 
back to D’s forming of the vicarious relationship or failure to divest of it; status offences, where 
we must locate D’s acts in gaining the status or failing to divest; or offences committed due to 
intoxication or other prior fault, leading D to cause harms when lacking voluntary control, 
where again we must trace back to D’s original acts.113 In each of these areas, it is contended, 
a focus on D’s voluntary conduct, and trying to understand the necessary nexus between that 
conduct and other offence elements, is the most informative route to effective evaluation. To 
take just one example, let us consider again the strict liability offence applied to parents whose 
children fail to attend school regularly.114 D will be liable for this offence whenever her child 
fails to attend school regularly, regardless of her efforts to ensure the child attends, and 
                                                          
113 Cf. Hart, who would present prior fault cases as an exception to the VAR. Hart (n8 above)106-112. See also, 
Dimock (n63 above). 
114 An offence under the Education Act 1996, s441.  
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regardless of her knowledge of non-attendance.115 Rather than dismiss this offence as lacking 
a VAR, it is more informative to trace D’s necessary conduct, and to ask what D has done or 
failed to do in the context of this offence. The answer is either that D has done something in 
simply having a child with all potential liability flowing from this, or that D has failed to 
prevent something she was unaware of or unable to control. We may then ask whether this 
conduct is sufficiently wrongful, or sufficiently linked to the mischief of her child, to justify 
criminalisation rooting from it.  
The VAR forces us to ask questions of this kind; and they are worth asking. As Sullivan 
has highlighted, when courts have asked questions of this type, real improvements have been 
possible.116 For example, section 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 creates an offence of 
belonging to a proscribed organisation, with a specific ‘defence’ available if D can show that 
the organisation was not proscribed when she was active, and that she has not been active since. 
Constructing the offence in this manner seemed to create a pure-status offence (ie, being a 
member) with any analysis of D’s actions appearing as a defence. Identifying this issue, the 
House of Lords held that D could only be legitimately blamed for the mischief of the offence 
if she joined the organisation after it was proscribed or if she was active during this period; 
demonstrating a link to conduct was essential for blame, and so the absence of a ‘defence’ had 
to be reinterpreted as a core element of the offence.117 This is only one example of course, and 
even this should not be presented as the finishing point for appropriate evaluation: we can and 
should still question whether ‘active’ membership of a group is a legitimate target for 
criminalisation. However, it does demonstrate that the VAR can have a useful role within the 
                                                          
115 This strict interpretation of the offence was upheld by the Divisional Court in  Alison Barnfather v London 
Borough of Islington, Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2003] 1 WLR 2318, and again in New Forest 
Local Education Authority v E [2007] EWCH 2584. In the latter case, D was liable despite risks of violence to 
her and her daughter from her truanting son.     
116 See Sullivan (n17 above) 251.  
117 Attorney General’s Reference (No4 of 2002) [2005] 1 AC 264. 
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evaluation of an offence, helping us to understand that for which D is (or critically, is not) 
blameworthy.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Within the plethora of debates about minimum requirements for criminalisation, or acceptable 
limits, the VAR has maintained an enviable status: it is wholly, or at least partially, accepted 
as a rule of substantive criminal law across jurisdictions, several of which have codified it into 
legislation. However, in holding such a unique status, the VAR is also made vulnerable. 
Vulnerable to its ‘friends’, who would like to adapt and reinterpret the requirement to achieve 
more, seeing it as an acceptable vehicle for broader theories of criminalisation, and/or 
comprehensive theories of action in general; and vulnerable of course to its critics, who 
challenge its unprecedented status, and expose the overstatements of its advocates. 
 This article has attempted to strip-back the VAR, and simplify the debate surrounding 
it. Breaking the VAR from its reliance upon metaphysical theories of action, the article has 
provided a definition of voluntary conduct within the criminal law and explained the vital role 
that can be played by that requirement. The VAR set out in this article is not claiming to do 
more than competing theories, either descriptively or normatively; indeed in many ways it is 
claiming to do considerably less. However, it is claiming to provide a descriptive stability that 
is not shared by competing theories, and it is maintained that the core normative benefits of the 
VAR can still (can only) be achieved through this mechanism. The current status of the VAR 
within the criminal law of England and Wales can be described as precarious at best, with 
courts equivocal as to its usefulness,118 offences created without clear reference to conduct, and 
                                                          
118 See, for example, Robinson-Pierre [2013] EWCA Crim 2396, where the Court of Appeal interpret liability to 
require an act [42], but also state that Parliament may create offences without such action [38].  
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perhaps most concerning, the ‘defence’ of automatism becoming progressively weaker in its 
application. It is contended that such trends can only be reversed through the acceptance of a 
viable model for the VAR, and it is this model that has been defended. 
